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Fifty-one fishermen in the coastal villages of Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani
were interviewed to discover the current state of fishing in these areas. Each area has its
own Village Fishermen Committees and those committees were also a subject of interest,
interviewing their members as well as Fishery Department Officials to gain an
understanding of how the committees function and their success. Results of fishermen
interviews revealed a large number of differences between Kizimkazi Dimbani and
Jambiani. Village Fishermen Committees were well attended by participants in both
villages and seem to function as strong institutions within the communities studied.
Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani are both situated within the Menai Bay Conservation
Area, and governed by its rules and regulations. However, enforcement is limited within
this area and knowledge of the regulations is as well. The regulations that fishermen
were aware of in each village perhaps reveal the most common illegal practices there.
The perceived effectiveness of patrols differed largely between the two study sites, which
was attributed to the fact that two of the three patrol boats for the Menai Bay
Conservation Area dock in Kizimkazi Dimbani. Most fishermen noted that many illegal
methods of fishing were still being used, causing damage to fish stocks. Potential
policies to alleviate the problems identified through interviews are discussed using a
broad definition of policy that includes the social, economic, and biological factors,
which influence policy outcomes.

Introduction:
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The Nature of Zanzibari Fisheries
Zanzibar’s fisheries are vitally important to coastal communities and the fishing
industry has a large effect on society as a whole. Fish are not only a key source of
protein in the Zanzibari diet, but also provide the livelihood upon which roughly 40,000
fishermen depend. (Jiddawi, 2012) Many other livelihoods exist related to fishing;
namely boat building, fish mongering, and the creation and sale of fishing gear. The
fishing industry in Zanzibar has seen enormous growth since 1990 when there were only
8,365 fishermen. (Phelan and Stewart, 2008)
Like fleets in other East African coastal areas, Zanzibari fishermen constitute an
artisanal fleet. It is comprised of small boats, which use fishing technologies that are not
capital intensive, and which remain within a few kilometers from the shoreline. The area
of fishing is restricted by the distance boats can travel, and the only permitted gears are
ones with low efficiency as a means to keep catch sizes small; in this way fish stocks in
Zanzibar have historically been maintained without requiring additional policies. Nearly
all fishing activities on the island utilize the following four methods: line fishing
(mshipi), fish traps (dema), nets with holes for small fish to escape through, and nets with
smaller holes to catch sardines. (Jiddawi, 2012) Fishermen in Zanzibari waters have
recently adopted outboard motors to increase the distance they may travel in response to
near shore fishery overexploitation and deterioration. (Khamis Ali Pandu, Interviews) As
more and more fishermen join the industry, artisanal methods of fishing will need
additional attention to keep fish stocks at healthy levels.
Fishing Laws within Zanzibar
Fishing methods currently outlawed in Zanzibari waters include spear-guns,
noxious or poisonous substances, explosives, and nets or dema traps with smaller than
authorized holes (varies by net type and location). Additional methods can be prohibited
illegal by the rules governing specific areas. (RGZ, 2010) First time offenders are “wisely
talked to” by the local authority and their gear is confiscated. (Juma Haji Ame, Halfan
Isah, Interviews) Second time offenders receive a fine ranging from 100,000tsh to
10,000,000tsh (62.50USD – 6,250USD) for violations relating to explosives or noxious
gasses, while all other violations (spear-gun use, illegal nets or dema traps) receive a fine
of 100,000tsh to 5,000,000tsh (62.50USD – 3,125USD). (RGZ, 2010, Juma Haji Ame,
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Interviews) Third time offenders are charged and required to appear in court and if found
guilty can be sentenced to serve jail time, pay a fine or both. (RGZ, 2010, Juma Haji
Ame, Interviews) In 2011, five cases appeared before a judge, and as of April 2012, two
cases have resulted in court hearings this year. (Juma Haji Ame, interviews) According to
Juma Haji Ame, an employee of the Menai Bay Conservation Office headquarters in
Stone Town, the number of court cases (and fishing law violations generally) is
decreasing because knowledge of the law and its enforcement has effectively extended to
many fishing communities.
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Zanzibar (part of the Republic of
Tanzania) extends 200 miles from the eastern coasts of Pemba and Unguja out to sea, but
an industrial fleet capable of traversing such distances does not exist, at least not of
Zanzibari origin. Foreign fishing boats are permitted to operate in these areas provided
they buy a one time fishing vessel permit, which costs 48,000USD for trawlers and
21,600USD for finfish as of 2003, a foreign boat must also purchase an annual fishermen
license, which costs 162USD. (FOA, 2004) In addition, boats from the Tanzania
mainland fish in the EEZ of Zanzibar, with trawling permits costing 68USD and finfish
permits for 4.8USD. (FOA, 2004) These fees go to the Tanzanian government however,
and not directly to Zanzibar. Within the EEZ, there are areas designated for artisanal
fishermen’s exclusive use, which are referred to as the territorial waters of Zanzibar.
(RGZ, 2010) Intrusions by industrial vessels into artisanal zones are a growing problem
as the number of industrial ships has increased over the last ten years. (FOA, 2004)
Governance Strategies of Zanzibari Fisheries and Issues
Zanzibar’s fisheries are managed by the policies and regulations of the Zanzibar
Fisheries Department. Like other agencies within Zanzibar’s government, the Fisheries
Department is responsible for locating external donors to satisfy its budget requirements,
which naturally gives these external donor organizations a large amount of decisionmaking power. While the Fishery Department of Zanzibar institutes policies, it is
important to understand the role these external organizations play, as funders through this
process. (Levine, 2004) The donors tend to be foreign NGOs.
The Fisheries Act of 2010 charges the Department to monitoring fish stocks,
create policies that encourage sustainable fishing activity, educate fishermen, and
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promote higher value addition and improved marketing of Zanzibari fish. (RGZ, 2010) It
is also charged to protect and maintain small-scale fishing. (RGZ, 2010) The Fishery
Department typically takes a top-down approach, designating Marine Protected Areas
(MPA’s), limiting methods and requiring licenses for fishermen and their boats, each of
which must be renewed annually. (FOA, 2004)
One exception to its customary top down approach is the Department’s method
for collecting its per kilogram tax on each fisherman’s catch. . The Department hires a
beach recorder, or in Swahili – bwana dikos for each landing site, generally an educated
person or leader of the community where they work. Utilizing community structures
already in place makes fishery management simpler and more effective. The Department
reduces the transaction costs involved with enforcing the per kilogram tax by decreasing
time spent traveling from home to the landing site and eliminating the difficulty of
familiarizing oneself with a foreign community’s fishing activities. (de la Torre-Castro,
2006) While the development of the bwana dikos has certainly improved efficiency
within the Fisheries Department, these local employees face different difficulties as the
channel for information between government bodies and the local resource users
themselves. Researcher Torre-Castro (2006), classifies these difficulties as:
The four dilemmas: kinship, loyalty, poverty, and control,” concluding that each,
“seriously jeopardizes the flow of the extensive knowledge that the bwana dikos actually
have, and reduces the effectiveness of the formal governance systems for coastal fisheries
management.” (Torre-Castro, 2006)
Because of close community ties, the duties of a bwana diko are often overlooked in
favor of maintaining their good standing within the community.
To understand Torre-Castro’s conclusions in action, an explanation of the Swahili
term muhali is in order. It translates literally to “impracticability”, but author Khalfan
explains its true meaning as an influential cultural norm within Swahili society. “[In this
context muhali means] neglecting to inform others of any pessimistic or negative realities
to protect them from disappointment, but eventually creating greater disappointment
when the true circumstances are revealed.” (Khalfan, 2011) The bwana dikos discussed
by Torre-Castro (2006), are in the difficult position as the pivot point between the
government and their own community. Not wanting to reveal negative realities, these
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officials often mask opinions, distort information and adopt entirely “different roles
according to the situation,” in an attempt to please the two groups to whom they are
accountable. (de la Torre-Castro, 2006) Muhali limits the effectiveness of bwana dikos,
as transmitters and enforcers of government policy, but muhali permeates Zanzibari
culture and effects everyday transactions unrelated to fishing. For example, when one
orders a dish from a restaurant if the restaurant is missing a key ingredient their response
will be to go out and purchase it to fulfill their guest’s request, despite imposing a delay
of three hours to your food. (Khalfan, 2011) Traditional policy-making does not
incorporate the cultural norms of muhali, or other salient cultural norms, which can
critically effect management outcomes.
Evidence provided by Tobey (2006), reveals that poverty is another one of the
driving forces motivating the breaking of rules designed to conserve resources for future
use. As stated by the Mr. Said Ali Mbarouk, Zanzibar Minister of Livestock and
Fisheries, “the need for fishermen to catch fish in order to survive is compelling many
small-scale fishermen to resort to illegal fishing practices.” (Daily News, 2012) Thus,
improvements to the institutions governing community fisheries, must work towards
outcomes that develop the social, economic, and biological aspects of communities in
question. These factors play a significant role in the willingness of communities to
accept management strategies and their eventual success. (Cunningham and Boss, 2005)
As these features may differ between communities, the communities themselves must be
included in the policy-making process or risk overlooking behavior that will affect a
policy’s outcome. A study conducted in the Chwaka Bay Conservation Area by de la
Torre-Castro and Lindstrom (2010), revealed the need for “a broader institutional
approach that better considers norms, values and cultural issues.” (Simonsen, 2010)
Policies must be developed and tailored on a community-by-community basis for them to
succeed. Torre-Castro and Lindstrom’s study of the Chwaka Bay Conservation Area
supports this approach. They conclude that, “gaining knowledge about the wide
institutional setting takes time but the investment is worth it in the long run.” (TorreCastro and Lindstrom, 2010)
In 1997 the Menai Bay Conservation Area (MBCA) was created to combat
destructive fishing practices and the pressures of uncontrolled fishing, introducing
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management plans for the Menai Bay Area. (Torell et al., 2006) The WWF sponsors the
Conservation Area while other donors include USAID, MACEMP, Woodshole and the
British Government. (Levine, 2004; Torell et al., 2006) The management strategy utilizes
community support by creating Kamati za Wavuvi or Village Fishermen Committees
(VFC) for each shehia (village) within the area. Villages in the MBCA elect ten
fishermen by ballot to sit on a committee, which in turn selects a chairman. Fishermen
are elected for three years and may be reelected indefinitely. (Aboss Juma, Simai,
Interviews) “The VFC organize fisheries patrols within their areas, and report illegal
fishing activities to the government” whose trained patrols are responsible for arresting
violators. (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006) Fishermen from their respective VFC engage in
“reef monitoring, data collection, and a number of volunteering activities like beach and
coral reef cleaning.” (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006) Further duties of the VFC involve
collecting information to improve conservation, encouraging fishermen to adopt
conservation ideas and practices, and acting as liaisons, like bwana dikos, between local
communities and the Fisheries Department. (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006)
On the community level, problems experienced while fishing are brought to these
VFC members who relay them to government officials during quarterly kamati tendaji
meetings (including all villages). Each village within the MBCA sends their respective
VFC chairmen to the quarterly meeting where problems are discussed in a dialogue led
by Fisheries Department officials. Solutions are agreed upon and regulations applicable
across the Conservation Area are approved and promulgated by the Fisheries Department.
(Halfan Isah, Interviews) These regulations are then adapted to each village by their
respective VFC. (Halfan Isah, Interviews) Each VFC holds monthly or bi-monthly
meetings with the fishermen they represent, relaying information concerning policies, and
creating a space for discussion of issues. (Aboss Juma, Haji Saburi Simai, Interviews)
The creation of the VFC committees has had many benefits. As management
shifted to a more community level, feelings of ownership of the fisheries have been
increased. (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006) Fishermen interacting with the resource on a
daily basis can now express the problems they face, and discuss solutions. Fishermen
now act as enforcers of the regulations, notifying the patrols when bad practices have
been sighted and this in turn reduces the time, effort and petroleum expended by the
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MBCA’s patrol boats. By including fishermen in the enforcement strategy, patrols have
more effectively stopped intrusions by mainland boats as well as the use of illegal gears.
(El Kharousy and Juma, 2006, Juma Ame, Interviews)
The Menai Bay Conservation Area stretches from Mazizini, less than 5km from
the urban center of Zanzibar Town to Bwejuu – see figures 1 and 2, while the seaward
boundary extends 61km from shore. (Torell et al., 2006) Three boats patrol this area: two
small and one big, each with powerful outboard engines. (Juma Haji Ame, Interviews)
Back in 2003, the Menai Bay Conservation Area was smaller; only from the Fumba
Peninsula to the southern tip of Unguja an area of 470 square kilometers, yet even then
difficulties arose with the size of the patrol area. (Torell et al., 2006) Only the two small
patrol boats existed then, and like today they were stationed in Kizimkazi Dimbani.
(Levine, 2004) The problem in 2003 was that these two patrol boats were assigned a huge
area to monitor. Fuel costs for the powerful motors and the long distances patrols had to
travel, combined to make enforcement in the vicinity of Kizimkazi Dimbani more
effective than the western side of the conservation area near Fumba. (Levine, 2004) This
is a contributing reason why dislike of the MBCA varies from village to village. Other
differences in geography, infrastructure, and proximity to the Menai Bay Office’s capital
(patrol boats, and radio headquarters) create divergent responses to the conservation
initiatives between Menai Bay villages. (Levine, 2004) Recently however, a Menai Bay
Office was created in Fumba and there is a further plan to create another office in
Jambiani in the next couple of years. (Halfan Isah, Interviews) These locations have been
chosen due to the high volume of tourists visiting these villages.
Figure 1: Menai Bay Conservation Area (MBCA) in 2006, which has since been
expanded to include the area along the east coast up to Bwejuu.
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The
he territory under conservation has been sizably increased since 2003,
2003 to include
the areas between Mazizini and Fumba and from Kizimkazi
mkazi to Bwejuu. Since only
o
one
boat has been added to the patrol crew, the inadequacy of enforcement resources
documented by Levine (2004) persist today as the territories for patrolling have almost
doubled. Currently, the
he patrols fuel revenue is generated by a tax on tourism of three
dollars per person, but 30% of the tax revenue funds the VFCs and the remainder is
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insufficient to meet petrol needs of the patrols. As a result, patrols are often incapable of
responding to reports due to a lack of petrol. (Levine, 2004, Halfan Isah, Interviews) Mr.
Shomari, the head of a patrol team, believes “underfunding is the biggest challenge,”
explaining that additional boats are needed to improve the patrols’ success. (Daily News,
2012) The VFCs of the Menai Bay villages use the tax revenue to counteract beach
erosion, repair broken vessels, compensate injured fishermen and in other ways provide
an additional layer of resilience to fishing communities. (Aboss Juma, Interviews) Other
sources of income for VFCs are the dago regulations, whereby migratory fishermen pay
to fish and camp in a given villages’ area. (Aboss Juma, Interviews) The dago is opened
and closed at the discretion of the Menai Bay Office leaving the tax as the only constant
source of income. Further sources of revenue are needed both for the patrols and for the
VFCs.
Although VFCs have generally improved the lives of fishermen, they have created
some problems that future management adjustments must keep in mind. Occasionally,
VFCs have made decisions out of line with conservation principles, including decisions
to continue using destructive methods, which sacrifice future benefits for the present. (El
Kharousy and Juma, 2006) Also, “opportunism has been repeatedly observed” as self
interested VFC members allow illegal practices to go on, share patrol schedules with
wrongdoers or warn them of unscheduled patrols. (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006) One
other consideration for community-based management policies is kinship: effectively
restricting enforcement to non-community members as friends and family fail to report
each other’s violations. Potentially the most damaging failure of the VFC management
system occurs when the committees fail to act as the intermediary between government
and communities of fishermen. (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006) If VFCs stop representing
the views of their communities fishermen cooperation within the management system
disintegrates. (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006)
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Study Area:
Kizimkazii Dimbani and Jambiani were the two villages visited. Both villages are
within the Menai Bay Conservation Area
Area. These two villages were chosen for their
fishing activities and to reduce the cost of travel as they are nearby. The villages were
also selected for their different locations – Kizimkazi
mkazi Dimbani facing the Menai Bay and
Jambiani looking out across the Indian O
Ocean. Over the years the MBCA has been
increased up to its current boundaries
boundaries, see figure 2., but the size of the area before can be
seen in figure 1.

Figure 2: Circled in red are the two study areas, while the two arrows denote the
boundaries of the MBCA,, and the distance that the three patrol boats must cover.
Both villages have a fair amount of tourist
tourist-based activities. Kizimkazi
mkazi is well
known for its dolphin tours, attracting tourists for day trips
trips, while Jambiani has beautiful
white sand beaches.. Hotels along the beaches are common in both locations
locations,, but in

Colbert-Sangree
Colbert
13

Jambiani there are many more. Jambiani is situated along the east coast of Unguja,
where the tourist industry is well established. (Torell et al., 2006)
The two villages have fishing areas that overlap with neighboring communities.
Kizimkazi Dimbani’s fishing area extends east to Makunduchi and west to Mtende, with
fishermen from these villages conversely entering the areas close to Kizimkazi Dimbani.
Jambiani’s fishing area stretches north to Bwejuu and south to Makunduchi with vessels.
Both villages are small: Kizimkazi Dimbani has a total of 280 fishermen and a population
of 1360, while Jambiani has 260 fishermen and a population of 8,000. (Kamati Chairmen,
Interviews, Torell et al 2006, Zanzibar Action Project, 2012) Industrial fishing boats
from mainland Tanzania often intrude on these small-scale fishing areas. As you can see
in the map below, the Tanzanian mainland is about twenty-five miles from Zanzibar and
closer to Kizimkazi Dimbani than Jambiani.
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Figure 3: Marked on this map by circle and arrow are the two study areas, also visible is
the proximity of the Dar es Salaam urban area.
Aside from fishing, other livelihoods exist in both villages. These alternative
livelihoods, generally occupied by women, include harvesting of octopus and other
othe
mollusks by combing tidal areas and seaweed farming. (Torell et al., 2006) Through this
work women in Kizimkazi
mkazi Dimbani and Jambiani are able to generate income and
provide additional
tional food for their families. Other alternative employment opportunities
have been orchestrated by the MBCA, including beekeeping, tree planting, mangrove
replanting and protection
tection of existing mangroves. (Torell et al., 2006)
Seasonal variations
iations of ocean currents affect the hotspots for fishing in Zanzibar.
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Fishermen in Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani often do not go out to sea when the
monsoon switches from NE to SW. The shift in ocean current causes southern seas to
become too dangerous for small boats. When fishing is safe however, these two villages
see a large number of migratory fishermen, from elsewhere in Unguja and mainland
Tanzania.
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Methodology:
Six days were spent in Kizimkazi Dimbani, and four days in Jambiani. In
Kizimkazi Dimbani 28 fishermen were interviewed and in Jambiani 23 fishermen were
interviewed. First-hand experience was gained through accompanying a fisherman on his
boat and seeing the practices they use in the areas around Kizimkazi. Additionally,
members of the Fisheries Department were interviewed in a less structured way to gain
an understanding of the VFC system for village based management. In each village
visited, the VFC chairman was interviewed, and in Kizimkazi Dimbani three other
members of the VFC were present with the chairmen. Furthermore, local contacts
provided by Doctor Narriman Jiddawi, who were knowledgeable about general fishing
practices and problems were interviewed.
Interviews of fishermen were carried out on an opportunistic basis using a
translator, and sessions were undertaken at different times of day to get a more diverse
sample. Fishermen were found by walking through the village, approaching houses of
known fishermen or by finding fishermen socializing in different town areas. Fishermen
were interviewed sometimes alone and other times in groups, one after another.
Translators were of great help finding fishermen to interview, but also likely did not
sample randomly, instead choosing fishermen they knew. This is unfortunate, but given
that researchers are not always received kindly it is an unavoidable source of error for
someone requiring a translator in Zanzibar. The questions asked can be found in
appendix I. Responses were relayed by the translator and recorded. Participants were
thanked for their time and the next participant was located. Data was then compiled in
Microsoft Excel.
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Results:
I. Biographic Information
A. Age of Fishermen
Average age of fishermen
ishermen (both villages): 41.49
Average age Kizi
Kizimkazi Dimbani: 43.39
Average age Jambiani: 39.17
B. Number of Years
ars Fished
Average years fished (both villages): 20.17.
Average years K
Kizimkazi Dimbani: 20.77
Average years Jambiani
Jambiani: 19.43
C. Origin of Fishermen
All fishermen were native to the village in which they were fishing.
II.. Reasons for Becoming a Fisherman

Kizimkazi Dimbani
7%
4%
No other job
11%

Fishing village
43%

3%

Lack of education
Enjoys fishing
To earn money

14%

Inherited
Other
18%

Figure 7: Reasons why fishermen in Kizi
Kizimkazi Dimbani become fishermen.

Colbert-Sangree
Colbert
18

Jambiani
9%
9%
No other job
43%

9%

Fishing village
Enjoys fishing
Life is a struggle
To earn money

30%

Figure 8: Reasons why fishermen in Jambiani become fishermen.
A plurality of respondents in both villages voiced “no other job” as their reason
for fishing. A similar response to this, and the second most common response was my
town is a “fishing village”. A small percentage in each village responded that they fish
because they “enjoy
joy fishing”, 3% and 9% for Kizi
Kizimkazi and Jambiani
mbiani respectively.
Another point
oint of interest is that in Kizi
Kizimkazi
mkazi a sizeable portion of respondents (14%)
noted that a lack of education was responsible for their decision to become a fisherman
while in Jambiani this reason was not voiced by respondents
respondents.. A few interesting
responses, under the other category were: because there were many fish back then, and I
chose between the sea or the forest.
III.. Tradition of Fishing within Families
Responses were practically
actically identical between Kizi
Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani with
72.24% and 73.91% of respondents from the respective villages responding “yes” their
father had been a fisherman as well
well.
IV. Equipment Used
A. Breakdown of Boat Type by Village

Colbert-Sangree
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Kizimkazi Dimbani
10%

17%

11%

Fiber w/
Ngalawa
Dhow
Rents/Shares
62%

Figure 5: The composition
ition of fishing vessels in Kizi
Kizimkazi Dimbani.

Jambiani

9%

9%

9%

Fiber w/
Ngalawa

4%

Canoe
Rents/Shares
69%

Fishes w/out boat

Figure 6: The composition of fishing vessels in Jambiani.
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The most common boats in both villages were ngalawas – dugout canoes with
outriders on both
oth sides that provide balance. Ngalawas can be paddled or wind powered
with a sail. It should bee noted that a higher percentage of fishermen in Kizimkazi
mkazi
Dimbani own fiber boats with motors than in Jambiani. The percentage of dhows (sail
boats larger than ngalawas and without outriders
outriders)) in both locations was about the same as
was the number of people
le renting or sharing boats of varying types.. In Jambiani there are
some who fish without a boat, swimming, fishing from shore, or combing the low tides
for fish and octopus.
B. Fishing Gears

Gear used by Kizimkazi Dimbani
Fishermen
4%
11%

Fishline
Fishline/Net
Net

85%

Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen.
Figure 9: The composition of gear used by Kizi
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Gear used by Jambiani Fishermen
9%
4%

Fishline

4%

Fishline/Net

4%

Fishline/Dema
Net

5%
52%

Net/Dema
Dema

9%

Fishline/Net/Dema
Spear
13%

Figure 10: The composition of gear used by Jambiani fishermen.
The most significant difference between the two vill
villages
ages is that in Kizimkazi
Kizi
Dimbani line fishing is almost the exclusive method of fishing, while Jambiani fishermen
use a more diverse
iverse set of technologies. In Jambiani the use of multiple gears was
wa also
much more common and a gear type exclusive to Jambiani, was the use of spears noted
by 9% of respondents.
C.. Communication or Navigation Equipment
In Kizimkazi Dimbani
Dimbani, 46.42% of respondents bring cell phones with them out to
sea, but in Jambiani
ni only 8.69% of fishermen bring cell phones. No other kinds of gear
were discussed, although to help respondents answer the question – many of whom did
not understand – suggestions of maps, GPS, and cell phone were offered.
V. Perception of Catch Size
A. Average Weekly Catch by Gear Used
When analyzing responses of average catch size over a week, both gear used, and
boat type were analyzed for their influence on catch size.
Table 1: A breakdown of catch size based on gear used by fishermen in Kizimkazi
Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012..
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Gear Used by Kizimkazi
Fishermen
Fishline
Fishline/Net
Fishline/Dema
Net
Net/Dema
Dema
Fishline/Net/Dema
Spear
Gear Used by Jambiani
Fishermen
Fishline
Fishline/Net
Fishline/Dema
Net
Net/Dema

# of
gear
22
3
0
1
0
0
0
0

Avg Weekly Catch
62.70
116.67

12
3
2
1
1

Standard
Deviation
55.08
76.38

20

30.5
28.17
77.5
500
55

22.25
28.06
31.82

Average Catch per Week (kg) by Gear Used
Dema
Fishline/Net/Dema
Spear

1
1
2 5.75

100
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0.35
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0

Figure 11: A comparison between both villages of catch size per week based on gear
used.
Note: 1 outlier was removed from the above graph,, a fishermen from Jambiani who
reported to catch 500kg per week. He reported that his crew of 15
15-20
20 fishermen would
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fish using a large net and multiple boats, so this is the reason for the larger catch, still the
number offsets the other data and has been kept out of the above graph.
You can notice that Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen are more successful with
fishing line and that fishing line and the use of a net causes a large increase for Dimbani
fishermen. Jambiani’s highest catches each include the use of dema trap in common.
The standard deviations are very high and thus error is also very high for this data.
B. Average Weekly Catch by Boat Type
Table 2. Average catch size by boat for Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012.
Kizimkazi Dimbani
Fiber w/ motor
Ngalawa
Rents/shares
Dhow
Fishes w/out boat
Canoe
Overall Average
Jambiani
Fiber w/ motor
Ngalawa
Rents/shares
Dhow
Fishes w/out boat
Canoe
Overall Average

# of Boat
5
18
3
3
0
0
29

Weekly Catch (kg)
144
54.08
44.5
86.25

Standard Deviation
81.73
35.94
28.65
90.16

2
16
2

57.5
39.91
252.75

3.53
31.04
349.66

2
1
23

6.5
15
55.96

0.71

71.41

Average Catch per Week (kg) by Boat Type
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Figure 12:: both villages average catches per week based on type of boat used.
used
Fishermen using fiber boats with motors (fiber w/) are more successful
essful than all
other fishermen. Comparing the two villages, Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen are much
more successful than
han Jambiani fishermen. In boat types used by each village, Kizimkazi
fishermen report higher average catches per week.
C. Amount of Catch
atch Consumed
Table 3. Average
verage % of catch kept by fishermen for consumption in Kizimkazi
mkazi Dimbani
and Jambiani, 2012.

Village
Kizimkazi Dimbani
Jambiani

If catch size is If catch size
If catch size is greater
g
than
All
30 kg or
is 30kg Fishermen
below
100kg
or equal to 100
29.63%
42.06%
23.33%
23.02%
25.73%
27.20%
30.06%
12.60%

Generally, fishermen keep a large percentage of their catch for personal and
family consumption. In Kizi
Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen generally
ally keep a slightly higher
percentage of their overall catch. Jambiani fishermen keep roughly the same
ame percentage
of their catch in most categories
categories,, with the exception of average weekly catches above
100kg. Both villages exhibit a smaller percentage of the catch kept for consumption
Colbert-Sangree
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when the average catch is above 100kg. While it appears that this is a more serious
phenomenon in Jambiani, only three responses were recorded in that category there,
while there were nine over 100kg from Kizimkazi Dimbani, making the Jambiani data
less accurate.
D. Perceptions of Changing Catch Size
Respondents noted, almost uniformly, that an average week’s catch was larger
when they first started fishing. Excluding two outlandishly large perceived changes in
catch size: 4900% and 18,081% (from Kizimkazi and Jambiani respectively), an average
week’s catch many years ago, for Kizimkazi Dimbani was 188.60% larger than today,
and for Jambiani 97.11% larger.

Years fished and Perceived Change in Weekly
Catch: Kizimkazi
1000.00%
Years fished and
Perceived Change in
Weekly Catch

800.00%
600.00%
400.00%

R² = 0.1506

Linear (Years fished
and Perceived
Change in Weekly
Catch)

200.00%
0.00%
0

20

40

60

Figure 13: A graph of Years Fished vs. change in weekly catch size for Kizimkazi
Dimbani.
The above graph shows Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen’s years fished and their
perceived change in the average week’s catch. The correlation coefficient R^2 is 0.15
revealing a slight correlation between the variables. For Jambiani fishermen even this
slight correlation did not exist. Four fishermen from Jambiani responded that their catch
had increased since they started fishing. When asked why, three responses were due to a
lack of experience with fishing when they first became fishermen, while one respondent
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said there were more fish today. These responses likely affected the overall trend for
Jambiani.
VI. Markets for Fish
A. Location of Markets
In Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen either sold their fish right off the beach, or
would transport them – also sometimes paying somebody to transport them – to Stone
Town by dala dala (bus) where a larger market returned higher profit for their efforts.
63.63% of Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen sell from the beach, while 22.72% sell both at
the beach and in Stone Town. 9.09% sell only in Stone Town and 4.54% of fishermen
interviewed sell either in Stone Town or in Dar es Salaam on the Tanzania mainland,
about 25 miles from Kizimkazi Dimbani.
Jambiani fishermen, with the exception of three respondents, all sell off the beach.
Many respondents noted that they sell to either middlemen, or villagers. Also some noted
that they sell directly to hotels and restaurants. One of the respondents who does not sell
in Jambiani, sells in Stone Town, while the second sells in both Jambiani and Stone
Town and the third sells up the eastern coast from Jambiani: in Paje and Bwejuu as well.
B. Changes in the Price of Fish
Table 4. Perceptions of how the price of fish has changed for fishermen of Kizimkazi
Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012.
Village
Increased Fluctuates Decreased Remained the same
Kizimkazi Dimbani
78.57%
14.29%
3.57%
3.57%
Jambiani
73.91%
8.70%
4.35%
8.70%
Responses are similar for both villages: the price of fish is increasing. Many
times it was noted that the price fluctuates based on the season, due to fishermen’s
abilities to get fish or not get fish during the SE monsoons. When the sea gets rough
fishermen are more cautious, thus returning to shore with fewer fish. Also discussed
regularly was the idea that the actual price has remained the same because cost of living
increases have kept pace with fish prices.
C. Perceived Reasons for Price Changes
Many answers were given, but in the interest of simpler results responses were
compacted into the following categories: Tourism, Cost of Living (including inflation and
cost of equipment increase), Higher Demand/Lower Supply (including more buyers,
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more fishermen, less fish and population growth), and Bad Markets (including
middlemen setting the price levels and distance from large markets), Seasonal and
Unknown. Many respondents voice multiple reasons for the changes in price and these
responses were counted as individual responses, thus the percentages add to over 100%.
Table 5. Reasons provided for changes in the price of fish in Kizimkazi Dimbani and
Jambiani, 2012.
Village
Kizimkazi Dimbani
Jambiani
(cont)
Kizimkazi Dimbani
Jambiani

Tourism
17.86%
17.39%
Bad
Markets
3.57%
13.04%

Cost of Living
Increase
39.28%
43.48%

Higher Demand/Lower
Supply
46.43%
13.04%

Seasonal

Unknown
10.71%
8.69%

0.00%
4.35%

One additional response of interest was that the use of nets was causing the price
to increase.
VII. Effort Spent Fishing
A. Time Spent Fishing Currently
Table 6. Average days fished in a month for Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012.
Village
Kizimkazi Dimbani
Jambiani

Now
17.91
18.65

Before
21.04
18.41

Eighteen of fifty-one fishermen fished the same amount now as when they started.
Thirteen respondents fish more now than before and nineteen fished more before than
they do now.
B. Change in the amount of Time Spent Fishing and Reasons for this
Change
In Kizimkazi Dimbani, four respondents fish more today than when they first
became fishermen due to: inexperience, fewer fish nowadays (x2), and not having a
family to provide for in the past. Many of the older fishermen interviewed responded that
they fished more before because they were younger and stronger. Many fishermen also
noted that they enjoyed fishing more back when they started and went out more days of
the month. Two respondents now have another job, which limits the time they spend
fishing.
In Jambiani fishermen also noted on multiple occasions that there were fewer fish
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now, and that other jobs had been found to help support themselves. One respondent
noted that before he did not have a family to support and also a single respondent noted
that inexperience was the reason he fished less before. Three respondents noted that they
had started fishing while still in school and for this reason had only fished on the
weekends when they first became fishermen. One more interesting response was from a
fisherman who also makes a living as a witch doctor. He fishes fewer days now, due to
there being more work for him as a witch doctor.
C. Pressure Felt by Fishermen
Table 7. Pressure to spend less time fishing broken down by village and by who is
pressuring for Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012.
From
From fisheries
From
Village
fishermen?
dept?
both?
Kizimkazi Dimbani
83.33%
0
0
Jambiani
4%
4%
13%
Shown above, 83.33% of Dimbani fishermen feel pressure from other fishermen
to spend less time fishing. Jambiani fishermen however, do not generally feel pressure
from other fishermen; 21% responded that they feel pressure of some kind, and of those
21%, 13% experience it from the Department as well as fellow fishermen. While some
Jambiani fishermen do feel pressure, it is not nearly as pervasive as in Kizimkazi
Dimbani.
VIII. Enforcement of Fishing Regulations
A. Fishermen Participation: Reporting Violations
Table 8. How violations are reported by fishermen, and to whom are fishermen reporting
in Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012.
Village

Kizimkazi Dimbani
Jambiani

Call from Boat:
Menai Bay
Office
Committee
28.57%
14.29%
0.00%
4.35%

Upon Return to Shore
Find:
Menai Bay
Office
Committee
3.57%
14.29%
21.74%
21.74%

Do not
Report
Either
25.00%
0.00%

Shehah
0.00%
4.35%

In Kizimkazi Dimbani, 42.86% of fishermen report violators by calling either the
Menai Bay Office or a member of the VFC from their boats, while in Jambiani this
number is only 4.35% of fishermen. This is due to 46.42% of Kizimkazi Dimbani
respondents bringing cell phones with them fishing, but in Jambiani only 8.69% of
fishermen bring cell phones. In Kizimkazi Dimbani 42% of fishermen notify an official
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14.29%
47.83%

upon return to shore, while in Jambiani this number is slightly higher at 48%. One of the
largest differences is the numbers of fishermen who do not report, which in Jambiani is
almost 50% of respondents.
B. Perceived Effectiveness of Menai Bay Patrols
Table 9. Perceived Effectiveness of MBCA Patrols by fishermen in Kizimkazi Dimbani
and Jambiani, 2012.
Village
Kizimkazi Dimbani
Jambiani

Yes
35.71%
30.43%

No
32.14%
65.22%

Sometimes/A little bit
32.14%
4.35%

Responses of “sometimes” or “a little bit”, were confusing, because in many ways
if a patrol is only effective some of the time, then it is not effective at stopping bad
methods of fishing, but at the same time these responses are different from “no’s”
because the respondents are making clear that the patrols do at times function effectively
and therefore are not entirely useless. An interesting finding from interviewing Haji
Saburi Simai, the Chairman of the Jambiani VFC, was that patrols are less effective
because they fear the reaction of violators who often respond with violence to the seizure
of their illegal gears.
IX. Knowledge of Management Strategies
A. Knowledge of Regulations in the MBCA
Of those with knowledge of regulations, two or three regulations were gained
from each fisherman. Each of these responses is counted individually and percentages
reflect overall awareness of specific policies among all fishermen interviewed. Only
responses heard more than once were included in the table below:
Table 10. Percentages of fishermen aware of specific fishing regulations in Kizimkazi
Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012.
Fishing Regulations
No Spear Fishing
No Stun Poison
License for Boat and Fisherman
Don't pull nets - destroys corals
Avoid Juvenile Fish through:
No Small-holed Nets
No Small-holed Dema
General Avoidance

Kizimkazi
Dimbani

Jambiani
45.45%
0.00%
4.55%
13.64%

4.35%
17.39%
4.35%
13.04%

54.55%
9.09%
4.55%

56.52%
4.35%
4.35%

Additional responses that appeared only once include: no use of dynamite, no
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swimming with your gear, no using big nets deep underwater, no use of spear-guns, and
that in Kizimkazi Dimbani there is an area close to the village designated for older
fishermen, allowing them to continue fishing despite lower levels of fitness. This last
regulation was one created by the VFC of Kizimkazi Dimbani and the respondent who
explained its existence to me was a member of the committee.
Another fact of interest is that 13.64% of respondents from Kizimkazi Dimbani
and 43.48% of respondents from Jambiani could not recall a single fishing regulation.
B. Knowledge of Traditional Methods of Management
Of the forty-four respondents asked this question, thirty-two had no knowledge of
a custom, tradition or taboo. In Kizimkazi Dimbani, four respondents explained
traditional gears used, and five others explained that it was dangerous to go fishing when
the sea was rough. In Jambiani, two respondents recalled that years ago there had been a
no fish area in the channel of the lagoon that was only fished during hard times, and two
others recalled that there had been an octopus harvesting season partnered with a season
of no octopus harvesting. Neither of these practices is still included in present
management.
X. Participation of Fishermen in VFC
Table 11. Percentage of fishermen who attend VFC meetings in Kizimkazi Dimbani and
Jambiani, 2012.
Village
Kizimkazi Dimbani
Jambiani

Yes
75.00%
69.57%

Sometimes
10.71%
4.35%

No
14.29%
21.74%

A few responses were further explained: in Jambiani, a fisherman remarked that
he goes to meetings when a representative from the Fisheries Department is present (he
was counted in sometimes), and also one Jambiani fisherman said “not yet” (he was
counted as a no).
XI. Present Difficulties with Fishing
Table 12. Largest issues for fishermen and the number of responses in Kizimkazi
Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012
Kizimkazi Dimbani
Illegal Methods Still Used
Small-holed Nets Still Used
Illegal Methods Used by Villagers
Illegal Methods Used by non-Villagers

Responses
12
5
1
1
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Illegal Use of Legal Methods (eg, using nets deep)
Menai Bay Patrols
Communication btwn Kamati and Fish dept.
So many methods Legal/Illegal
Some want to preserve others don't care
None
Jambiani
Small-holed Nets still Used
Illegal Methods
Gear Interference btwn/among Fishermen
Lack Fishing Gear
Boats Break/Sink
Cannot go far from Shore
Harder to get fish
Kamati Corrupt
Capture of Illegal Gears Harms Fishermen
Fish dept. tries to stop fishermen from fishing
Doesn't know

1
8
1
1
1
1
11
5
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

The most common responses in both villages were persisting uses of illegal
methods, on many occasions small nets were specifically noted. In Kizimkazi Dimbani
specifically, the second most common problem was related to the Menai Bay Patrols;
either they would not stop the bad practices, that they were not always ready to go to sea,
they didn’t really care about enforcing the regulations or the officials were in league with
fishermen practicing illegal methods. In Jambiani some of the most common issues aside
from illegal gear were issues of gear interference among fishermen, namely nets
destroying dema traps or nets interfering with fish line users. Also, commonly heard
responses in Jambiani were: lack of technology and capital, inability to fish further out
from shore, competition with fishermen from elsewhere, and the problem of boats
breaking down while out at sea. Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen voiced none of these
concerns.
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Discussion:
I. Differences between two villages: Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani
A. Capital Intensity
Fishing in Jambiani generally appears to be less capital intensive than Kizimkazi
Dimbani. Kizimkazi has twice as many fiber-bodied boats with motors as Jambiani, as
well as finding no fishermen who operate without boats in Kizimkazi Dimbani. The data
gathered by Levine (2004) posits that 50% of vessels in Kizimkazi Dimbani are equipped
with motors. The differences between the two sets of data could result from Levine
(2004) including all boats while this paper’s data is only looking at fishing vessels,
excluding vessels for tourism activities. Another piece of evidence for higher capital
intensity in Kizimkazi Dimbani is that when asked about the problems they face, 21.74%
of Jambiani fishermen noted a lack of gear, as their main problem while this issue did not
arise for Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen. Differences in catch sizes also emphasize the
point that fishing is less capital intensive in Jambiani.
B. Reporting Capabilities and Perceptions of Enforcement
The number of fishermen who bring phones with them to sea is much higher in
Kizimkazi Dimbani than Jambiani. This seriously affects patrols abilities to respond to
violations as they depend on fishermen to relay information of violators’. Almost 50% of
Jambiani fishermen do not report violations at all, and those that do report upon return to
shore must deal with a long delay between sighting the infraction and when the patrol is
notified. Coupled with the fact that no patrol boats exist in Jambiani, but two are
stationed in Kizimkazi Dimbani you would expect patrols to be more effective in
Kizimkazi. This is seen in the data, as 65% of Jambiani fishermen do not think the
patrols are effective, while 68% of Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen think that the patrols
are effective at least some of the time.1 The effectiveness of patrols in both locations
must be improved to allow regulations to take their full effects.
C. Catch Size and Markets
The data collected on catch size per week, by boat type and by gear used reveals
some differences between the two villages. Perhaps Kizimkazi Dimbani is a more
1

35.71% of Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen think the patrols are effective, while 32.14%
believe the patrols are effective sometimes or a little bit.
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productive fishing area, and that explains the difference in average catch per week or it
could relate to past fishing practices. The difference in catch size per week translates to
higher profits for Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen, and greater financial security. Despite
Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen being slightly better off, based on catch size per week,
both villages consume close to equal percentages of their own catches. This is interesting
because you might expect a plateau to occur, whereby fishermen consume up to a certain
number of kilograms and no more, however as Kizimkazi Dimbani consumption is on par
with Jambiani (as a % of the total catch per week) it would seem that catching more fish
translates to eating more fish. This possibly reveals differences in the availability of
markets to each village. With many hotels in the area nearby Jambiani there is high
demand for fish. However in Kizimkazi, where tourism is focused around morning
dolphin tours, it seems fishermen consume more fish themselves as the demand for fish is
less. Data gathered on markets reveals that 36% of Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen seek
out larger markets than the beach-landing site, while only 13% of Jambiani fishermen
take their catch beyond the beach. This provides evidence for the above reasoning that
there is higher demand for fish in Jambiani than Kizimkazi Dimbani.
There is a general consensus that average weekly catches have decreased since
fishermen first entered the market. One reason for this decline in catch size could be that
fish stocks have decreased, which many respondents did make note of in their interviews.
Also possible however, is an overall increase in the number of fishermen reducing the
catch size of each individual fisherman. Most likely a combination of the two above
factors is causing weekly catches to decline. According to Pomeroy, due to poverty and
the high cost of entering and exiting the market, “as long as small-scale fishermen can
obtain a positive return, they will continue fishing.” (Pomeroy, 2011) As more fishermen
enter the small-scale fishing market the overall catch is spread over a larger number of
people. If all of these fishermen take a survival strategy to fishing, catching as much as
they can each day, then the overall catch will shrink. This situation reduces the welfare
of all those involved with the fishery, by shrinking individual catches and endangering
the future existence of the resource.
II. Price of Fish Increases but not Welfare
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The price of fish is increasing, but as many respondents noted so is the cost of
living. Fishermen interviewed were very familiar with the notion of supply fluctuations
influencing the price, and it is for this reason that a concerted effort to reduce the size of
catches is possible. As part of the knowledge base is already well understood fishing less
could increase welfare for all involved with the fishery by increasing the price of fish.
From the perspective of fishermen the “purpose of a fishery is to produce income rather
than fish, and so costs of catching the fish have to be taken into account.” (Cunningham
and Boss, 2005) Catching fewer fish raises the price of the fish that are caught, while
requiring less effort from fishermen. As long as markets are appropriately responsive,
the revenue of fishermen could be maintained while reducing the time and effort spent
fishing, effectively increasing the welfare of fishermen.
III. Pressure to Fish Less and Overcapacity
Pressure to spend less time fishing can reveal overcapacity2 within a fishery. As
catch sizes become smaller, the result of many fishermen and fewer fish in the sea,
competition and pressure felt by fishermen increases. If capacity were at its optimal
state, this pressure to fish less would be uncommon because catch sizes would not be
shrinking. In Kizimkazi Dimbani where 83% of respondents feel pressure to reduce
fishing efforts from other fishermen, there seems to be overcapacity. This pressure does
not exist as strongly in Jambiani. Perhaps because the gear used by Jambiani fishermen
is more diverse and less competition exists due to a greater diversity of species in
Jambiani. Or due to larger markets in Jambiani, additional fish caught does not reduce
the price of fish for other fishermen as it might in a smaller market situation. Another
cause for differing levels of pressure could be that Jambiani fishermen are less educated
about fishing and do not fully understand the danger of overcapacity, while Kizimkazi
Dimbani fishermen are exposed to these dangers more often living in a town where a
MBCA office is located. The other option is that overcapacity is less of a problem in
Jambiani. As perceptions of past weekly catches are lower in Jambiani than in Kizimkazi
Dimbani, perhaps fish stocks have not deteriorated as much in Jambiani and overcapacity

2

Capacity for fisheries is defined as a fleet’s ability to catch fish, therefore overcapacity
occurs when a fleet’s ability to catch fish is greater than the fishery’s ability to replenish
itself.
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is in fact less of a problem. No conclusions can be drawn without further research
looking into the actual state of fish stocks.
IV. Management Strategies
A. Knowledge of Current MBCA Regulations
In both locations knowledge of the regulations governing fishing in the MBCA
was sparse. Although the interviewee was asked to identify only two or three regulations,
a general understanding of the laws in effect was not present. This was seen to a greater
extent in Jambiani, where 43.48% of respondents couldn’t answer with a single
regulation. The difference in awareness between the two villages is likely a function of
having a Menai Bay Office located in Kizimkazi Dimbani, while such an office is not
present in Jambiani. The issues that were noted by fishermen from each village perhaps
suggest the fishing methods causing the biggest problems in their areas. Using this logic,
small-holed nets are the largest problems for both locations, followed by the use of speargun’s in Kizimkazi Dimbani and stun poisons in Jambiani, with the third most common
illegal method being the use of drag nets in both locations. Complete knowledge of the
policies governing fishing in the MBCA by fishermen was very uncommon, and likely
the result of the transaction costs associated with providing these small coastal villages
with the needed information. Making information of illegal practices more available to
fishermen will reduce their use, as many fishermen do not know of the illegality of their
practices. Also, since village fishermen are the ones charged with reporting sightings of
bad practices, enforcement will be improved if fishermen know the extent of the methods
they are supposed to report.
B. Understanding and Use of Traditional Management Strategies
The information about customs, traditions and taboos revealed that for the most
part neither village is aware of, or practicing any traditional methods of fishery
management. It is likely that in Kizimkazi Dimbani this question was not translated
effectively. Answers varied widely in their nature from what gears are traditionally used,
to general caution of the sea during rough times. In Jambiani translation was more
effective and a few traditional management methods were uncovered, however in general
fishermen were ignorant of community organized strategies of management.
C. Acceptance of and Participation with VFC
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The data on attendance of VFC meetings was reassuring. This newly created
institution as part of the strategy for managing fisheries seems to have high participation
rates within both villages. Attendance is slightly lower in Jambiani, most likely due to
less effective patrols and a more distant connection to a Menai Bay Office. Still,
attendance is 70-75% in both villages and management initiatives must utilize these
meeting places to their advantage and as a channel for future policies. Resilience is a
goal of SSF management, and past attempts at management from the small coastal village
of Kayar in Senegal, the many islands of Mauritania, and the Pacific Halibut Fishery have
revealed the need to incorporate social, economic and biologic factors into the
management scheme. (Cunningham and Boss, 2005) The creation of VFCs seems
successful in satisfying the cultural aspects of the MBCA’s strategy as it has been
incorporated into the existing structures of these communities.
V. Effectiveness of Patrols and Proximity to MBCA Office
The problems of fishing in Kizimkazi Dimbani are the use of illegal methods and
ineffectiveness of the MBCA patrols. Jambiani fishermen agreed with Kizimkazi
Dimbani fishermen on the problem of illegal methods, but made no mention of the
patrols. As patrols are constantly seen in the docking area of Kizimkazi Dimbani, their
presence is constant, while Jambiani fishermen do not see the patrols or Menai Bay
Officers very often. Additionally, less awareness of the regulations in Jambiani might
reduce the perceived problems of patrols ignoring violators. Also a factor in the
effectiveness of Jambiani patrols is the reality that patrols often fear violent reactions
when attempting to enforce laws and seize illegal gears. (Haji Saburi Simai, Interviews)
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Conclusion:
Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani, although both being governed by the same
policies and management schemes as part of the MBCA, differ in many ways regarding
their relationship with nearby fishing areas. The composition of fishing vessels, gears
used, the ability of fishermen to aid in enforcement, average catch sizes per week, levels
of pressure to reduce time-spent fishing felt by fishermen, the perceived effectiveness of
patrols, and knowledge of MBCA regulations all differ between Kizimkazi Dimbani and
Jambiani. The policies of the MBCA have improved conditions of fishing in general by
reducing the frequency of illegal practices however; within the MBCA many villages
receive more effective management than others. The location of MBCA capital has a
large influence on the success of patrols, but even in these locations there is plenty of
room for improvement as illegal practices are still seen frequently by fishermen.
Improving the effectiveness of patrols however, is not a simple issue. Fishermen lack the
communication equipment to relay information of violators, the MBCA is underfunded
resulting in a lack of patrols and petroleum for patrol boats, and corruption exists within
patrols who do not always stop illegal practices. Each of these problems adds complexity
to the dilemma of enforcement.
Although the price of fish is increasing, the welfare of fishermen is not. This
reveals the need for a more comprehensive management plan. Evidenced by the pressure
within the Kizimkazi Dimbani fishing community to fish less, overcapacity is a problem
in this area and management should account for these concerns as well. Knowledge of
traditional management methods was very uncommon in both villages, thus new policies
must be created to solve these problems. Participation within VFC meetings is high
within both villages and the potential for these meetings to accomplish additional
management goals in the future is promising.
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Recommendation:
The MBCA covers a large portion of Unguja. The most pressing issues currently
include but are not limited to: enforcement issues, fishermen being unaware of the laws
governing fishing, a lack of management that takes into account the differences existing
between villages within the area, and a lack of funding. Policies must be crafted to
remedy these issues, but key throughout this process is using a broadened definition of
policy, to account for the cultural norms that govern community relations. As McConney
and Charles (2008) write, “the delineation between social and ecological (and between
nature and culture) is artificial and arbitrary.” Policies must take into account the
structures currently in place in each village to develop successful management schemes.
One of the greatest strengths of MBCA villages is the connectedness of their
communities. While this is often the culprit of policy failures as shown by muhali in the
issue of bwana dikos, if matched with the correct management strategy, these strong
communities could support resilient systems. If for example, patrollers each came from
the communities they were meant to protect, they would be less likely to allow illegal
practices to continue as their fellow community members would be the ones suffering
lower catch sizes due to ineffective patrols. Although this effort would likely reduce
illegal practices, some patrollers might still act in self-interest, accepting bribes to allow a
foreign vessel’s entry. To remedy this issue, there should be a reward-based system,
perhaps on a monthly basis, that gives salary bonuses to patrollers who effectively stop
illegal practices. If for example, patrollers in the MBCA recorded the number of vessels
apprehended by patrol teams and each month the patrol vessel that successfully stopped
the most boats received a bonus to their salary, enforcement would become spirited as
patrols seek the monthly salary bonus. The acclaim of being the month’s most successful
patroller could be handed out during monthly VFC fishermen meetings and in this way
successful patrollers would feel appreciated for their efforts. By providing patrollers with
a financial incentive to enforce the laws, they will be less likely to accept bribes, and by
publicizing their success in VFC meetings they can gain social recognition for good
work.
To improve knowledge of fishing regulations within the MBCA postings of the
regulations could be placed on the beach where fishermen anchor their boats. Although it
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is expensive to install and maintain signs in the many villages of the MBCA, the measure
would increase knowledge of illegal fishing regulations, as fishermen would see the signs
every time they went to sea and positively effect knowledge of management strategies.
Despite differences that make management a tricky task, these communities are
not entirely dissimilar. To create effectively manage the MBCA it is essential that each
village be visited and some degree of education for fishermen of the different
management options occur. This would take a considerable investment of time and
effort, but it is likely that successful management schemes for these villages would be
similar. The creation of a portfolio of management schemes to present to villages within
the MBCA would simplify this process and each village could choose a strategy
appropriate to its circumstances. The goal here is to increase the welfare of fishermen by
reducing the time they spend fishing while keeping incomes relatively stable, and at the
same time allowing fish stocks to recover to increase future catch sizes. Management
strategies must be adopted for each village, to account for their different fishing
relationships and make management as successful as possible.
One of the difficulties with this tactic is that villages have overlapping fishing
territories. One way to deal with this fact is by zoning the different areas of Menai Bay.
Zones in this arrangement would not overlap, but if tied to the current system of vessel
licensing fishermen with more mobile boats could purchase the rights to fish in multiple
zones, through the purchase of their annually renewed fishing licenses. By color coding
the zones and placing tags that correspond to the different zones on each licensed boat,
enforcement could be made easier within this arrangement. The current system of
enforcement, adjusted through the addition of financial incentives for patrollers, could be
used to enforce this zoning policy. As fishermen will be purchasing the rights to different
fishing areas, the policies would be self enforced (as fishers who do not purchase the
rights to an area where they are fishing will be reported by those who did), with the
exception of kinship limiting within community reporting. This exception would be
minimal however, as it would generally be limited to the zone closest to their village, and
entering other zones, with different villages’ fishermen, would result in them being
reported by non-related fishermen. Also, if introduced through the channel of VFCs with
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appropriate education explaining the policies and reasons for them, communities would
hopefully accept and adopt such a policy.
Currently policies extracting resource rents are largely unsuccessful due to the
issue of bwana dikos, muhali, poverty and kinship discussed earlier. As mentioned
above, if management arrangements can be found for the many villages within the
MBCA, this opens the opportunity for the creation of a revenue generator. This revenue
could be directed to VFCs efforts to increase their community’s resilience and to provide
more fuel for patrol boats.
Additional funds could be gained by liquidating gears confiscated by Menai Bay
Patrols. In Kizimkazi Dimbani, many ships confiscated were beached onshore, not being
used and their value was depreciating. While most gears confiscated cannot be sold due
to their illegality, some can and this is a source of additional revenue.
Although only a few weeks were spent gathering information throughout this
study, the issues were not difficult to observe. Living within these villages, talking with
fishermen and gaining a surface understanding of the problems they face, some
semblance of the scope of the entire issue has been exposed. Future research about
fishery management is needed, especially research defining fish stock levels now and
uncovering data or perceptions of past stock levels. It is my hope that these small coastal
communities receive more global focus to aid management efforts and at the same time to
create more intelligent local stewards of our world’s resources.
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Appendices:
Appendix I: Questions asked during fishermen interviews.
Name, Age, Origin, Boat Type
How many years have you fished?
Why did you start fishing?
Did your father fish?
What gear do you use?
What navigation and/or communication equipment do you take with you in the
boat? (many respondents failed to understand this question without the addition of
suggesting a map, a GPS, or a cell phone as possible answers)
How many kilograms of fish do you catch in an average week? (Best guesses
were encouraged as weighing of fish does not occur in the villages studied)
How much do you keep for yourself and your family to eat?
How many kilograms of fish did you catch in an average week when you started
fishing?
Do you ever feel pressure from other fishermen or the fisheries department to
spend less time fishing, even using legal methods?
Where do you sell your catch?
How has the price of fish changed since you started fishing?
Why do you think?
How many days per month do you fish?
How many days per month did you fish when you started fishing?
(If different from now) Why?
If you see someone break a regulation do you report them, to whom and how do
you report?
Are the Menai Bay patrols effective?
Are you aware of any fishing regulations in (insert village name)? (Respondents
were asked to explain 2 or 3 that they were aware of)
Do you know of any customs, traditions or taboos for when to fish and when not
to fish in (insert village name)?
Do you attend Kamati za Wavuvi meetings?
What are the current problems with fishing in (insert village name)?
Appendix II: Fishermen interviewed, and time of interview.
Interview
Start
9:47
10:03
10:28
10:45
11:04
11:20
16:17
16:38
16:52
17:01
17:14

Interview
End
10:02
10:20
10:44
11:00
11:16
11:34
16:30
16:52
17:01
17:13
17:23

Interview
Length
0:15
0:17
0:16
0:15
0:12
0:14
0:13
0:14
0:09
0:12
0:09

Name
Daudi Hamadi
Muhammed Abul Achmed Salu
Haji Juma
Nuhu Ibrahim
Nuhu Said
Hasan Hatibu Kidete
Isah Maulid
Ali Hasan
Hafud Musa
Abdallah Ali
Hasan Ibrahim Haji

Age
39
29
29
39
25
21
19
47
60
55
70
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17:24
17:35
17:53
18:04
18:16
13:47
14:03
14:13
14:27
14:42
14:51
15:35
15:49
16:13
16:31
16:43
17:00
16:36
17:10
13:21
13:49
14:03
14:16
15:02
15:15
15:31
15:38
15:47
16:10
16:20
16:27
16:34
9:42
10:02
10:16
10:28
10:40
10:52
11:20
11:32

17:34
17:47
18:03
18:15
18:25
14:00
14:12
14:26
14:39
14:50
15:03
15:48
16:00
16:22
16:42
16:55
17:06
17:00
17:32
13:45
14:01
14:14
14:30
15:13
15:29
15:37
15:44
15:56
16:20
16:26
16:33
16:40
9:52
10:11
10:26
10:38
10:50
11:01
11:28
11:40

0:10
0:12
0:10
0:11
0:09
0:13
0:09
0:13
0:12
0:08
0:12
0:13
0:11
0:09
0:11
0:12
0:06
0:24
0:22
0:24
0:12
0:11
0:14
0:11
0:14
0:06
0:06
0:09
0:10
0:06
0:06
0:06
0:10
0:09
0:10
0:10
0:10
0:09
0:08
0:08

Tahir Suleiman
Ali Saidi
Haladi Twalid Haj
Hasan Ibrahim
Juma Abdallah
Juma Kamati Ali
Ibrahim Hieri
Daudi Simba
Talib Hamis Muombawa
Talid Ibrahim
Hatid Amur
Ibrahim Naim
Ali Pandu
Muhammed Ibrahim Haji
Musah Machfun Musan
Suluhu Abdallah
Aboss Juma
Fasihi Usi
Siasa Pandu
Haji Mrisho
Mrisho Haji
Pandu Abdallah
Okala Muhammed
Jafar Hasan
Maudini Vahoda
Ibrahim Haji
Makame Hajaka
Ujudi Kipatu
Takima Abdallah
Chum Yahaya
Ahmed Haji
Muada Haji Vuay
Suleiman Kipatu
Musa Jeca Vuoy
Hasan Sinene
Haji Pandu
Daudi Abdallah
Hamis Pandu
Ali
Haji Snak

35
43
42
35
35
45
36
65
66
40
60
40
70
53
40
48
29
39
35
40
60
31
37
27
36
30
24
28
32
40
16
21
19
52
42
69
60
66
45
52

Appendix III: Government officials, local community members and other persons
interviewed in an unstructured manner.
Mr. Zahor Mohamed El Kharousy, Department of Fisheries Stone Town
Juma Haji Ame, Fisheries Department: Menai Bay Conservation Area, Stone Town
Okala Muhammed, Director of Jambeco: an NGO, Jambiani
Haji Saburi Simai, Chairmen of the Kamati za Wavuvi, Jambiani

Colbert-Sangree 45

Jafar Hasan, English Teacher/Fishermen/Translator, Jambiani
Halfan Isah, Financial Officer of the Menai Bay Conservation Area, Kizimkazi Dimbani
Pandu, Business Owner/Fisherman, Kizimkazi Dimbani
Khamis Ali Pandu, Restaurant Owner/Tour Guide Organizer in Kizimkazi Dimbani
Aboss Juma, Chairmen of the Kamati za Wavuvi, Kizimkazi Dimbani

Colbert-Sangree 46

